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HIGH-PROFILE PROSECUTORS & HIGH-
PROFILE CONFLICTS
Laurie L. Levenson*
"Maintaining the integrity and improving the
competence of the bar to meet the highest standards
is the ethical responsibility of every lawyer. "'
In high profile cases, prosecutors are often their own worst
enemies. The pressure to succeed too often causes prosecutors in the
spotlight to make strategic and ethical decisions that can backfire
against their case. Several recent high-profile cases illustrate this
problem: (1) the Michael Jackson child molestation trial, (2) the
Jesse James Hollywood murder prosecution, and (3) the clemency
proceedings of murderer Michael Morales.
This essay is not intended to embarrass any particular
prosecutor. Indeed, prosecutors in high-profile cases face a
particularly difficult task. Each decision they make is put under a
microscope by the media and its legal commentators. 2  Defense
lawyers are quick to claim prosecutorial misconduct, 3 knowing that
* Professor of Law, William M. Rains Fellow & Director, Center for
Ethical Advocacy, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author wishes to
express her gratitude to her fabulous research assistants, Shawn Domzalski and
Jeffrey Jensen, for their help with this Essay. As always, their assistance was
invaluable. Thank you also to the staff and editors of the Loyola Law School
Law Review for their fine editorial assistance. Finally, thank you to Sammy
and Marci Maniker-Leiter for their daily inspiration.
1. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-2 (1981).
2. For the ethical responsibilities of prosecutors in evaluating these cases,
see Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a
Commentator III, 50 MERCER L. REv. 737 (1999); Erwin Chemerinsky &
Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator II, 37 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 913 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being
a Commentator, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1303 (1996).
3. There is a plethora of excellent articles discussing the general problem
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in high-profile cases, mistakes that would have otherwise gone
unnoticed easily become morning headlines. The high-visibility
prosecutor cannot afford the missteps that plague others in cases that
escape public detection.
While there are many different types of prosecutorial
misconduct,4 this essay will focus on one rarely examined by the
legal community-conflicts of interests for high-profile prosecutors.
Whether caused by other cases they have handled or actions they
have taken in the high-profile case itself, prosecutors can find
themselves confronting conflict of interest situations when handling
a case that garners great media attention.
In considering these cases, it is important to remember that
prosecutors have ethical obligations beyond those of other attorneys.5
of prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Jennifer Blair, The Regulation of
Federal Prosecutorial Misconduct by State Bar Associations: 28 U.S.C. §
530B and the Reality of Inaction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 625 (2001); Abbe Smith,
Can You be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 355 (2001); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Zealous Advocacy in a Time of
Uncertainty: Understanding Lawyers' Ethics: Wrongful Convictions: It is
Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. REV. 275 (2004);
Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 Geo. WASH. L. REV.
169 (1997); Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It is Not Whether You Win
or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality
Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283 (2001); Michael T.
Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process:
There's More to Due Process Than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298
(October 1988); see also Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers
When a Prosecutor is Cited for Misconduct?, in HARMLESS ERROR:
INVESTIGATING AMERICA'S LOCAL PROSECUTORS (2003), http://
www.publicintegrity.org/prn/default.aspx?act=main; The Innocence Project:
Official Misconduct, Police and Prosecutorial Misconduct, http://www
.innocenceproject.org/causes/policemisconduct.php (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
4. Prosecutorial misconduct may range from vindictive prosecution and
grand jury abuse to suboming perjury, discovery violations and improper
closing arguments. Curiously, the Center for Public Integrity that studies
prosecutorial misconduct does not list ethical conflicts as a type of
prosecutorial conduct. See Weinberg, supra note 3. Part of the goal of this
Essay is to direct more attention to this issue so that both prosecutors and their
monitors will have greater sensitivity to the impact of conflict issues on the
fairness of criminal proceedings.
5. See generally Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The
Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORD. URB. L.J. 553
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Their job is not to win, but to "do justice.' 6 A prosecutor must
pursue the guilty, but also protect the innocent. The prosecutor must
combine the public welfare with the protection of the individual
citizen.7 The prosecutor does not have the luxury of just trying to
"win" a case. The prosecutor must strive to reach the just verdict in
a case.8 In addition to the ordinary codes of conduct governing
lawyers in their jurisdictions, 9 prosecutors operate under internal
policies' ° and ABA Standards for the Administration of Criminal
(1999) [hereinafter Levenson, Working Outside the Rules].
6. The United States Supreme Court in its famous opinion in Berger v.
United States, stated that the prosecution's interest "is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done . . . ." 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). For
thoughtful discussions of a prosecutor's duty, see Bruce A. Green, Why Should
Prosecutors Seek Justice?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999); Ferguson-
Gilbert, supra note 3, at 284-95.
7. The Supreme Court of Tennessee wrote:
[The prosecutor] is to pursue guilt; he is to protect innocence; ... to
combine the public welfare and the [safety] of citizens, preserving
both, and not impairing either; he is to decline the use of individual
passions and individual malevolence, when he cannot use them for the
advantage of the public; he is to lay hold of them where public
justice ... requires it.
Foute v. State, 4 Tenn. (3 Hayw.) 98, 99 (1816), quoted in JOHN JAY
DOUGLAS, ETHICAL ISSUES [N PROSECUTION (2d ed. 1993). While there have
been thoughtful discussions of what it means foi a prosecutor to serve the
"public interest," it is not generally contested that a prosecutor has the
additional responsibility to serve the broader public interest, and not just to
obtain a guilty verdict in a case. See Steve K. Berenson, Public Lawyers,
Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public
Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789 (2000).
8. See Bennett L. Gershmann, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV.
393, 455-58 (1992) (discussing the need to produce a prosecutorial ethos that
is associated with "seeking justice, rather than an ethos based on winning
convictions").
9. Each state has rules of professional conduct to govern lawyers who
practice in that state. Additionally, there are model rules of conduct upon
which these state rules are based. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT (2002-03); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1981);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). For an
excellent discussion of the court's role in enforcing lawyer's ethics, see Bruce
A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORD. L.
REv. 71 (1996).
10. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (U.S. Dept. of Justice 2006); see
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Justice created expressly to guide prosecutors.'"
Thus, prosecutors must be on heightened alert. Yet, when it
comes to high profile cases, prosecutors seem to commit the most
basic ethical violations, even those that they would be unlikely to
commit in a non-high-profile case. Why is this so? As this Essay
will suggest, high-profile cases put added pressures on prosecutors.
Not only do they feel extraordinary pressure to win, but they often
feel that they must personally succeed in the case. They sense that
they must go the extra mile in ensuring their case is a success, even if
it means taking steps they would not abjure in another type of case.
There are many lessons to be learned from high-profile cases.
However, one of the most basic is that prosecutors must be sensitive
to conflicts of interest they may encounter and quickly remedy them.
Failure to do so can compromise both the government's case and the
prosecutor's personal integrity.
I. THE WORLD OF CONFLICTS:
POP STARS, JESSE JAMES & LETHAL INJECTION
Prosecutors, like other lawyers, are governed by professional
rules of conduct. As members of the Bar, they must follow the
ethical codes of their states.1 2 Additionally, they must abide by the
ethical standards prescribed specifically for prosecutors.
One thing common to all of these codes is the prohibition
against conflicts of interest. In general, prosecutors "should avoid a
conflict of interest with respect to his or her official duties."'
' 3
also Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1971).
11. In particular, prosecutors are governed by the internal policies of their
prosecutorial agency; they are also guided by prosecution standards of ethics.
E.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1993); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (Nat'l
District Atty's Ass'n 2d ed. 1991).
12. In 1998, Congress passed the Citizens Protection Act. Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 801, 112 Stat. 2681-118 (Oct. 21, 1998). The law overruled an internal
Justice Department policy that had exempted federal prosecutors from state
ethical rules. Thus, federal prosecutors, like their state counterparts, are
subject to the ethical rules of the jurisdiction. See Angela J. Davis, The
American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86
IOWA L. REv. 393, 457 (2001).
13. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
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Specifically, prosecutors, like other lawyers, are prohibited from: (1)
concurrently representing clients with direct adverse interests, 14 (2)
representing clients whose interests are adverse to those of former
clients,' 5 and (3) representing clients when the lawyer has a personal
or business interest adverse to the client.16 Prosecutors are also
cautioned against becoming witnesses in their own cases.17
Prosecutors, even more than other lawyers, must retain the role
of advocate without becoming personally invested in a case.
Prosecutors are not allowed to permit their professional judgment "to
be affected by his or her own political, financial, business, property,
or personal interests," even though all high-profile prosecutors know
that the cases they are handling can make or break their futures.18
PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3(a) (1993).
14. Model Rule 1.7 reads:
[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the presentation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists
if: (1) the representation of one client wilbe directly adverse to another
client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client, a former client or a third person or by a persona
interest of the lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
15. Model Rule 1.9 reads:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to
the interests of a former client unless the former client gives informed
consent, confirmed in writing.
Id. R. 1.9.
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8.
17. Model Rule 3.7 provides:
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is
likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) the testimony relates to an
uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of
legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualification of the
lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client.
Id. R. 3.7.
18. See, e.g., Christine Hanley, Enron Prosecutor to Return to 0. C. to Work
at Law Firm, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at B1. Ironically, even prosecutors
who lose high-profile cases can end up with new career opportunities,
including those in the media. See, e.g., Marcia Clark, http://www.answers
.com/topic/marcia-clark (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
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A. Catching the King of Pop
Although these rules seem straightforward, time after time
prosecutors have run afoul of them. An infamous example is the
case of People v. Michael Jackson.19 Veteran Santa Barbara County
District Attorney Thomas Sneddon passionately pursued his case
against international pop star Michael Jackson. 21 His actions raised
two important ethical issues: (1) Is it unethical for a prosecutor to be
too passionate in his efforts to convict a defendant? and (2) Is it
appropriate for a prosecutor to participate in an investigation in a
manner that makes it likely that he will be a witness in the case?
Ethically, there is nothing wrong with a prosecutor wanting to
convict someone he sincerely believes is guilty. 22  However, as
19. People v. Jackson, No. 1133603 (Santa Barbara County, Cal. Super. Ct.
2004).
20. District Attorney Thomas Sneddon served as a career prosecutor for the
County of Santa Barbara. He failed to charge a 1993 allegation of child
molestation by Jackson because the victim would not cooperate after receiving
a large civil settlement. Following the 1993 investigation, Jackson recorded a
thinly disguised song attacking Sneddon. See Jackson Not Guilty: Jurors
Acquit Pop Star of All Molestation Charges, CNN.com, June 13, 2005, http://
www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/13/ackson.trial; Michael Jackson Sings of D.A.
on Previous Album, CNN.coM, Nov. 19, 2003, http://www.cnn.com!2003/
SHOWBIZ/Music/ 11/1 9/j ackson.prosecutor.reut/index.html.
21. Michael Jackson, the "King of Pop," became a singing sensation when
he was eleven years old. He initially sang for Motown with his brothers as part
of the acclaimed group, "The Jackson 5." Later, he became an international
singing star, appearing with his one sequined glove and dancing his signature
moonwalk. Beginning in the 1990's, Jackson gained more infamy than fame,
with charges of child molestation in 1993 and a short-lived marriage to the
daughter of Elvis Presley. See generally Steve Huey, Artists A-Z: Biography:
Michael Jackson, in ALL MusIc GUIDE (2005), http://www.vhl.com/artists/az/
jackson michael/bio.jhtml.
In 2004, Jackson was charged with four counts of lewd conduct with a
child younger than 14; one count of attempted lewd conduct; four counts of
administering alcohol to facilitate child molestation; and one count of
conspiracy to commit child abduction, false imprisonment and extortion. See
Indictment, People v. Jackson, No. 1133603 (Santa Barbara County, Cal.
Super. Ct. 2004). After a several month trial, Jackson was acquitted of the
charges.
22. "In an adversary system, [prosecutors] are necessarily permitted to be
zealous in their enforcement of the law." Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S.
238, 248 (1980).
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Justice Robert Jackson cautioned:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and
reputation than any other person in America. His discretion
is tremendous. He can have citizens investigated and, if he
is that kind of person, he can have this done to the tune of
public statements and veiled or unveiled intimations... [A]
prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a
technical violation of some act on the part of almost
anyone... It is in this realm-in which the prosecutor picks
some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or
selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for
an offense-that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting
power lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes
personal.23
Therefore, the question becomes whether a prosecutor has become so
obsessed with convicting a particular individual that he has lost his
judgment in evaluating the case.24
Certainly, in the Jackson case, there was more than enough
evidence to give the prosecutor strong suspicion that the defendant
had molested his victim. Police found mounds of sexually explicit
magazines inside Jackson's estate, Jackson admitted to sleeping with
the boy, and Jackson had a history of suspicious conduct. To date,
there is no evidence that Sneddon prosecuted Jackson simply
because he had a vendetta against him. Yet, the public perception
was that the case had become personal. Not only did this create
ethical challenges for Sneddon,25 it undercut his credibility in the
way that he handled the matter and gave the defense the perennial
23. Robert Jackson, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address to the Second Annual
Conference of U.S. Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AMER. JUD. SOC. 18
(1940), available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/theman2-7-6-1/.
24. See William Booth, Gloves Off: DA Thomas Sneddon Is Set to Go
Another Round with Michael Jackson, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at C01;
Wendy Thermos & Catherine Sillant, D.A. in Jackson Case Failed in 1993, but
has Reputation for Persistence, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at A24.
25. In the end, the prosecution was able to successfully defend against a
motion to remove the entire district attorney's office, but the conflicts issue by
Sneddon's animus toward Jackson created a major distraction for the
prosecution as it prepared for trial. See Steve Shawkins, Jackson Team Seeks
to Oust D.A. From Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at B7.
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46 26
"rush to judgment" defense. Future prosecutors would be best off
by scrupulously following the ethical prohibition against having "his
or her personal judgment or obligations ... affected by his or her
own political, financial, business, property, or personal interests. 7
Additionally, prosecutors in high-profile cases should avoid
creating unnecessary conflicts of interest for themselves. Again, the
Jackson case demonstrates how this easily occurs. In pursuing the
investigation against Michael Jackson, prosecutor Sneddon
personally drove the 150 miles down to Los Angeles to meet
individually with witnesses and to take photographs and descriptions
of a search location. 28 This conduct also created the potential for a
serious ethical problem.
29
It is easy for a prosecutor to end up as a witness in his or her
own case if the prosecutor is not careful. The ethical rules warn
against a prosecutor taking too active a role in the investigative phase
of a case. ABA Prosecution Standard 3-3.1(a) begins, "A prosecutor
ordinarily relies on police and other investigative agencies for
investigation of alleged criminal acts .. . ." It is only when those
agencies cannot or will not do their job properly that a prosecutor
should become more active. However, even when a prosecutor
becomes active in an investigation, it is important for a prosecutor
not to create a situation where he will become a witness in his own
case. Mr. Sneddon nearly fell into this trap by meeting individually
with his witnesses. As ABA Prosecution Standard 3-3.1(g) states,
"Unless a prosecutor is prepared to forego impeachment of a witness
by the prosecutor's own testimony... or to seek leave to withdraw
from the case. .. , a prosecutor should avoid interviewing a
prospective witness except in the presence of a third person."
26. This phrase was coined by the legendary defense lawyer, Johnnie
Cochran, in his successful defense of football star, O.J. Simpson. See
Associated Press, On Camera, The Defense Speaks; O.J Simpson a Victim of
"Rush to Judgment, " Mishandled Evidence, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 1995, at C1.
27. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION
FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3(f) (1993).
28. See Michelle Caruso, Jacko Gets to See His DA Grilled, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 15, 2004, at 16.
29. See generally Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for
Prosecutors in their Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 723 (1999)
(discussing the ramifications of increased prosecutor participation in police
investigations).
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Undoubtedly, Mr. Sneddon believed he was just being
conscientious when he went on his own to the search location and
met with his witnesses. Yet, this extra step in a high-profile case is
likely to cause problems that outweigh any conceivable benefits.
Prosecutors must resist the temptation to take the high-profile case
into their own hands and participate in ways they would not in other
investigations. Unless they have thought through the consequences
completely, prosecutors will quickly find themselves in an ethical
dilemma.
B. Jesse James Returns
Ironically, the co-prosecutor in the Jackson case also found
himself in ethical hot water, but not in the Jackson matter. Ronald J.
Zonen, a very capable attorney,3° co-prosecuted the Jackson case
with Sneddon. No sooner did the Jackson case end than Zonen
stepped into another high-profile matter.
Zonen was the prosecutor in the so-called "Jesse James
Hollywood" case. 3 1 Jesse James Hollywood was charged in 2000
with the murder of 15-year-old Nicholas Markowitz. At the time it
occurred, and later upon Hollywood's capture, the tragic and
sensational crime made headlines.
32
According to the prosecution, Hollywood and his co-defendants
had a falling out with the victim's brother, Ben Markowitz, who
owed them money from a drug sale. 33  To get back at Ben,
Hollywood gave orders for the others to kill Nick. They obliged by
driving the teenager to a trailhead, marching him to his gravesite,
binding and blindfolding him, and then beating and shooting him.
30. Ronald J. Zonen has been Chief Trial Deputy for the Santa Barbara
District Attorney's Office since 1991. See Findlaw, Lawyer Profile,
http://pview.findlaw.com/view/10934881 (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
3 1. Because of the brutal nature of the case, and the fact that the key
suspect became a fugitive on the FBI's "Ten Most Wanted List," the case
became a media sensation. See generally Jesse Katz, The Last Ride of Jesse
James Hollywood, L.A. MAG. 42, Feb. 1, 2002, at 42.
32. See, e.g., id.; Sue Fox, The Last Days of Nick Markowitz, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2000, at B 1.
33. The alleged facts of the crime are spelled out in detail in the
prosecution's pleadings in response to the defendant's motion to recuse the
prosecutor's office. See Hollywood v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 598,
606 (Ct. App. 2006).
1245
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1237
Although the body was found in August of 2000, Hollywood
was not apprehended until March 2005, when he was arrested in
Brazil and deported to the United States. During the time Hollywood
was a fugitive, the other Hollywood-the film capital of the world-
took an interest in his case. Nick Cassavetes, a film director and
screen writer, contacted prosecutor Zonen for his help in making a
film, "Alpha Dog," based on the Markowitz murder.
Zonen agreed to turn over materials to Cassavetes and act as a
consultant in his production of the film. He gave the director police
and probation reports, names, phone numbers and addresses of
witnesses, and, inadvertently, rap sheets containing criminal offender
information. Zonen was not paid for this assistance,34 but provided it
because he hoped that widespread publicity regarding the case would
help locate Hollywood and bring him to justice. He asked for a
notice at the conclusion of the film requesting the viewers to contact
the police if they knew of Hollywood's whereabouts and announcing
a reward for his apprehension.
According to Cassavetes, Zonen was enthusiastic about the film
being made and never said "no" to any of the filmmaker's requests.
In the words of one of Cassevetes' assistants, Zonen was "star struck
and eager to assist the film-makers." 35  Yet another one of the
producers, Michael Mehas, described the unprecedented access he
was given to Zonen's evidence, including the case computer disks,
photographs, audio recordings, videos, law enforcement evaluations,
psychological reports, and trial notebook with the prosecutor's
handwritten notes and personal impressions of the case.
36
In addition to working with the filmmaker, Zonen also assisted
the producers of a popular television show, "America's Most
Wanted," by giving them information about the crime. Once again,
he hoped their efforts would result in Hollywood's apprehension.
When he was apprehended, Hollywood wasted no time in filing
34. The ABA Standards specifically prohibit a prosecutor, prior to
conclusion of all aspects of a matter, from entering into any agreement or
understanding by which the prosecutor acquires an interest in literary or media
rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating
to that matter. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-2.11 (1993).
35. Hollywood, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 602.
36. Id. at 603.
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a motion to recuse37 the entire District Attorney's Office. After
attending a screening of "Alpha Dog," his counsel argued that the
film portrays Hollywood "in an extremely inflammatory manner, [as]
extremely manipulative, vicious, selfish, and without any redeeming
character traits whatsoever." Or, as described by other viewers, the
character of Jesse James Hollywood in the film is a "monster."
38
Hollywood's motion to recuse was based upon a claim that
Zonen could no longer be a fair and impartial prosecutor because he
had compromised his objectivity by his personal involvement in the
"Alpha Dog" film. Additionally, Zonen had "potentially infected the
jury pool with his views on the strength of the People's case." 39 The
California Court of Appeal agreed with the defense and, after an
evidentiary hearing by the trial court, issued a writ of mandate
recusing Zonen, but not his entire office, from the case.4 °
In its opinion, the appellate court went out of its way not to
personally criticize Zonen.41 Rather, it ordered Zonen off the case,
because it was particularly concerned about complications in a death
penalty case. Justice Gilbert's concurrence was much more
straightforward. He penned: "What is 'over-arching' here is not the
'penalty sought,' but the patent conflict that requires recusal
whatever the criminal charge. 42 As the concurrence saw it:
However appalling the crime for which defendant was
charged, he, like anyone charged with a criminal offense, is
entitled to a fair trial with all its attendant constitutional and
statutory safeguards. This includes not having to face a
prosecutor who has a conflict making it unlikely that the
37. See Cal. Penal Code § 1424 (West 2000).
38. Id.
39. Hollywood, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 606.
40. Id. On December 20, 2006, the California Supreme Court granted
review of the appellate court's decision and ordered its opinion, and that in a
companion case, to be depublished. See Hollywood v. People, 2006 Cal.
LEXIS 15719 (Cal. Dec. 20, 2006); Haraguchi v. Superior Court, No.
S148207, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 15058 (Cal. Dec. 20, 2006). The Supreme Court's
ruling is pending.
41. For example, Justice Perren wrote: "Zonen gets high marks for his zeal
in attempting to bring Petitioner to justice. This is consistent with his oath as a
prosecutor. The manner in which he went about achieving his goal, however,
is quite another matter." Hollywood, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 607.
42. Id. at 608.
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defendant will receive fair treatment "during all portions"
of his trial.43
Zonen created a disqualifying conflict by assisting the media, even if
he was doing it for well-intentioned motives. "[Zonen's] actions
allowed 'show business' to cast an unseemly shadow over this case.
The prosecution of criminal cases and entertainment enterprises are
best kept separate."
44
In every high-profile case, there is a risk that the prosecutor will
fall into the trap of cozying up too much to the media. With the
perception that there are two trials to win-one in the courtroom and
one in the court of public opinion-prosecutors often make the
mistake of playing to the media. As the Hollywood case
demonstrates, these actions are likely to backfire. In handling a
high-profile case, prosecutors must be acutely aware of the conflict
of interest created by the prosecution becoming overly engaged with
the media. In the past, the worst that prosecutors had to fear was an
admonition from the court or a gag order. Now, courts are willing to
find that it creates a disqualifying conflict of interest for a prosecutor
to blatantly use the press to the prosecution's strategic advantage or
for personal profit or self-promotion.
4 5
High-profile prosecutors have many challenges in dealing with
the press, but they can avoid their biggest problems by remaining
true to their ethical obligations. As public servants, prosecutors are
not allowed to use their official positions to obtain personal financial
gain. Moreover, as the Court of Appeal adjudged in a companion
43. Id. at 609.
44. Id. at 609.
45. In a companion case, the California Court of Appeal addressed the issue
of whether it creates a disqualifying conflict of interest for a prosecutor to
write and promote a novel that includes details from a case the prosecutor is
handling. See Haraguchi v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590 (Ct. App.
2006), review granted, No. S148207, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 15058 (Cal. Dec. 20,
2006). In Haraguchi, the prosecutor published a novel, Intoxicating Agent,
that was closely based upon one of the rape cases she was handling. Even the
physical description of the characters matched those in her real-life case. The
prosecutor promoted her book in the same county in which her case was being
tried, leading to a significant likelihood that potential jurors would be
influenced by her version of the case and her bias for the prosecution. Id. at
592-95.
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case, Haraguchi v. Superior Court,4 6 becoming entangled with the
media in an ongoing case creates a "disabling conflict of interest" for
a prosecutor. Prosecutors can become lost in the quest for personal
glory or profit, leading them to make decisions in cases that they
would not otherwise make. For example, after promoting a movie or
book that portrays a defendant as particularly heinous and the
prosecutor as virtuous and trustworthy, it may be very hard for that
prosecutor-author to offer a defendant a plea deal or seek a lesser
47sentence. There are no medals or monetary rewards for a
prosecutor who negotiates a settlement in a case, although it might be
the best for the defendant and the criminal justice system.
High-profile cases are traps for prosecutors. They must work
hard to successfully present a case that the media is watching. Yet,
they cannot be seduced by the media. To do so risks compromising
the prosecutor's objectivity and professionalism.
C. Lethal Injection: Killing a Client
The scheduled execution of death row inmate Michael Morales
made headlines in California, primarily because the defendant
contested the means of execution-lethal injection. The court stayed
the execution in order to hold evidentiary hearings as to whether the
manner of execution was cruel and unusual punishment. While a
great deal of attention was focused on this aspect of the case, less
attention was given to another important issue-i.e., whether the
prosecutors in the clemency proceedings had a disqualifying conflict
of interest.
Morales was prosecuted by the San Joaquin County District
Attorney's Office for the brutal rape and murder of a high school
student. According to the testimony in the case, Morales killed the
girl as a favor to his cousin who was jealous because the girl was
having an affair with the cousin's homosexual lover.
48
The number two official in the District Attorney's Office
happened to be a lawyer who had previously served as a public
defender. In fact, twenty-five years before Morales' clemency
46. 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590 (Ct. App. 2006), review granted, No. S148207,
2006 Cal. LEXIS 15058 (Cal. Dec. 20, 2006).
47. Id. at 597.
48. For a full account of the case, see People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244
(Cal. 1989).
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proceedings, the Assistant District Attorney actually represented
Morales in the very murder trial that landed Morales on San
Quentin's death row.
It is axiomatic that lawyers cannot accept employment adverse
to a former client without the client's informed consent.49 Even the
prosecutor conceded this during the proceedings. He agreed to a
court order that would prohibit him from talking to anybody in his
office about the Morales' case. However, the issue remained as to
whether his entire office would have to be recused from the
clemency proceedings.
The court held that the office was not recused, notwithstanding
the disqualifying conflict of the individual prosecutor. Ordinarily, if
one lawyer in a firm is disqualified, the entire office is disqualified.5 °
However, the recusal rules for government offices are relaxed. The
defense must show that the conflict challenges the impartiality and
integrity of the entire office. 51 Morales' lawyers attempted to make
this showing by arguing that Morales' ex-lawyer was a high-ranking
supervisor in a small office of prosecutors. Some courts have
recused entire prosecution offices, even when the individual attorney
did not share confidential information with others in the prosecutor's
office.52 Yet, neither the court nor the prosecutors in Morales
thought recusal was necessary.
53
Although their decision may have been legally defensible,5 4 it is
49. CAL. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT 2-111(B)(2); People v. Lepe, 211
Cal.Rptr. 432, 434 (Ct. App. 1985); People v. Lopez, 202 Cal.Rptr. 333, 341
(Ct. App. 1984). See also STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3(c) (1993) ("A
prosecutor who has formerly represented a client in a matter in private practice
should not, except as law may other wise expressly permit, participate in a
matter in which he or she participated personally and substantially while in
private practice or non-governmental employment. .. ").
50. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1980).
51. See People v. Hernandez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1991).
52. See, e.g., People v. Conner, 148, 666 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1983); People v.
Lepe, 211 Cal. Rptr. 432 (Ct. App. 1985).
53. Hernandez, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
54. Generally, the ethical rules imputing disqualification to other members
of a lawyer's office do not include government offices. See RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
STUDENT GUIDE 1.11-4(b) (2005-2006). Moreover, courts have broad
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deeply troubling when prosecutors associated with high-profile cases
have even a potential conflict of interest. For the general public, it is
very difficult to understand how a lawyer who used to represent a
defendant could stand by when in his new position he has the power
to save that client from execution. The technical rules of conflicts,
and the isolation of the lawyer, do not change the perception that a
defendant's own lawyer helped run an office that sought his client's
execution.
In high-profile cases, prosecutors must take the highest ethical
road possible. If and when Morales is executed, the question will
remain whether the proceedings, let alone the execution, were
handled in the fairest possible manner. The prosecutor's ethical
dilemma is likely to cast doubt on that decision.
II. AVOIDING THE CONFLICTS
High-profile prosecutors must be ready for prime time. Their
every move will be under scrutiny. As these examples and others
55
suggest, it is actually quite surprising how often high-profile
prosecutors find themselves in ethical dilemmas. With all the
scrutiny of high-profile cases, it is surprising that there has been
discretion when deciding recusal motion. Accordingly, even in situations
where recusal might be prudent, it is not always required. See, e.g., Millsap v.
Superior Court, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733 (Ct. App. 1999); People v. Hernandez,
286 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1991).
55. For example, the actions of Durham County District Attorney Michael
Nifong have come under great scrutiny in the highly publicized case involving
rape allegations against a group of Duke University lacrosse players. In
December 2006, the North Carolina Bar Association filed an ethics complaint
against Nifong, contending that he made prejudicial comments to the press and
engaged in deceitful and dishonest conduct by not disclosing exculpatory
evidence to the defense. See Victoria Ward, DA Nifong Faces State Ethics
Charges, THE CHRONICLE, Jan. 11, 2007, available at http://www
.dukechronicle.com/media/paper884/sections/20070111 News.html (follow
"DA Nifong faces state ethics charges" hyperlink). As with the Jesse James
Hollywood case, Nifong's pretrial contacts with the media raised questions
about his ability to handle the matter fairly, resulting in calls for his recusal
from the case. Id. Indeed, Nifong resigned "under an ethics cloud" in early
January. David Zucchino, D.A. in Duke Case Gives Up the Fight, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2007, at Al. Each of the lessons being offered in this essay would
seem to apply to Nifong's situation, which is only the latest high-profile case
to emerge.
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relatively little attention focused on the conflict situations that
prosecutors can face. Given the recent rash of these incidents, this is
the right time for those lessons to be learned.
A. Lesson #1: High Profile Cases Are
More, Not Less, Likely, to Create Conflict Issues for Prosecutors
Interaction with the media, the increased zeal "to win the big
one," and the reluctance to decline a high-profile assignment increase
the chances that a prosecutor will face a conflict issue. High-profile
prosecutors should have at the top of their case preparation checklist
a full review of their ethical duties, including those involving
conflicts of interest. These are the types of issues that often require
third party advice from, for example, an ethics expert in the
prosecutor's office. There is too much temptation for the individual
prosecutor to justify his or her decisions as one made in the best
interest of the case. A person not so invested in the case is often in a
better position to make that decision. 6
B. Lesson #2: Prosecutors Must Safeguard
Their Objectivity When Interacting with the Media
The one thing that distinguishes high-profile cases from other
types of cases is the amount of publicity they receive. It is nearly
impossible for prosecutors to avoid interaction with the media in
56. In other contexts, the ethical rules recognize the need for third-party
advice regarding conflicts issues. For example, ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.8 provides that a lawyer shall not entire into a business
transaction with a client unless the client "is given a reasonable opportunity to
seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction .... " MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(2) (2003). Prosecutors do not have
individual clients to consult. Rather, they must consider the interest of the
public in making their decisions. As a proxy for a client, prosecutors are best
off asking the advice of others who can voice the concerns of those who might
be affected by the conflict. Cf Rita M. Glavin, Prosecutors Who Disclose
Prosecutorial Information for Literary or Media Purposes: What About the
Duty of Confidentiality?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1809, 1848-51 (1995)
(proposing procedures for office approval of disclosures when prosecutor
wants to release confidential information to make a movie or publish a book).
In situations such as those in Morales, there may be individuals representing
the client who can and should be consulted regarding the waiver of any client's
rights.
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high-profile cases. However, prosecutors can-indeed are expected
to-interact with the media in a responsible manner. To ensure this,
the ethical codes set standards for trial publicity. ABA Model Rule
3.6 provides in pertinent part: "A lawyer who is participating or has
participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not
make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know will be disseminated by means of public
communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter."
The rules provide certain guidelines for all lawyers to use to
prevent unfair pretrial publicity. In general, information contained in
the public record or regarding scheduling matters in a case may be
released.57 Additionally, lawyers may make pleas for assistance in
apprehending a suspect, announce progress in the criminal
investigation and arrest,58 and warn of dangers from ongoing
criminal activity.
59
However, in their interaction with the media, prosecutors have
special responsibilities. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct
3.8(f) states:
[E]xcept for statements that are necessary to inform the
public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's actions
and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain
from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial
likelihood of heightened public condemnation of the
accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent
investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or
other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in
a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that
the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule
3.6 of this Rule.6 °
The recent decision to recuse the prosecutor in the Jesse James
Hollywood case, as well as his colleague, the novelist in Haraguchi
v. Superior Court, provides a clear indication that the court sees a
difference between necessary interaction with the media and
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b)(2), (4).
58. Id. R. 3.6(b)(7).
59. Id. R. 3.6(b)(6).
60. Id. R. 3.8(f).
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exploitation of one's contacts with the media. While no firm line is
drawn in these cases, the court seems to be sending the message that
becoming invested personally or financially in a media project will
endanger a prosecutor's objectivity.
For the last decade, commentators have warned of the danger of
prosecutors disclosing confidential information for literary or media
purposes. Unnecessary disclosures may prejudice pending
investigations, taint the potential jury pool, compromise government
informants, and even endanger the lives, safety and reputation of
others. 62 It is time to heed such warnings. Prosecutors should limit
their disclosures to the media to information that is absolutely
necessary. Under no conditions should prosecutors reveal
information, such as prior criminal records, that is confidential by the
relevant jurisdiction's laws. 63  Prosecutors should also avoid any
business deals with the media until a case is concluded. The focus
for prosecutors should be on achieving justice in a particular case,
not on advancing their own careers or financial status.
64
One possible challenge to this proposal is that it interferes with a
prosecutor's First Amendment rights. Certainly, prosecutors retain
some First Amendment rights. However, as the recent decision of
the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos65 emphasized, those rights
61. See, e.g., Glavin, supra note 54.
62. Id. at 1836-41.
63. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105 (2000); id. § 1140 et seq. (2004)
(prohibiting unauthorized release of criminal records); id. § 1054.2 (prohibiting
release of police reports with telephone numbers and addresses of victims); id.
§ 1203.05 (prohibiting release of probation reports). The U.S. Department of
Justice standards also prohibit the release of information. DOJ Guidelines will
allow the release of nonpublic information if it is in the interest of justice, but
will not allow it for personal gain. 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-10 (1994).
64. Cf ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250
(1943) ("The duty of an attorney to his clients is one of great delicacy and
responsibility and sometimes of apparent hardship. Every consideration of
personal advantage or profit must be subordinated to the interest and welfare of
the client, and information derived from the close and intimate relationship
necessarily existing should not be used to promote personal interests or for
personal gain.").
65. 126 S.Ct. 1951, (2006). In Garcetti, a prosecutor claimed he was
subjected to retaliatory employment actions when he complained about
dishonesty by one of the law enforcement officers in his case. Id. at 1956. The
Supreme Court held that the government's actions did not violate the
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are not unlimited. "When a citizen enters government service, the
citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her
freedom." 66 Public employers may limit employee statements made
pursuant to the employee's official duties.6 7  Therefore, when
prosecutors speak as prosecutors, they do not enjoy the full First
Amendment rights of other prosecutors.
A prosecutor who speaks to the press about a high-profile case is
not doing so as a citizen. He or she is doing so as the prosecutor who
has oversight for the case and the responsibility for pursuing a just
result. Accordingly, a prosecutor must act in a manner that puts the
public's interest above that of the individual prosecutor.
C. Lesson #3: Prosecutors Should Not
Give the Appearance of a Conflict in a High-Profile Case
"In conflict-of-interest theory, it is not only the reality of a
conflict of interest, but also an appearance of one, that is considered
undesirable." 68 The Supreme Court emphasized this principle in its
seminal decision of Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils.6 9
In holding that the appointment of counsel for a contempt case
cannot include an interested party, Justice Brennan discussed the
distinctive role of prosecutors and the need for the public to have
confidence in their decision making: "The concern that
representation of other clients may compromise the prosecutor's
pursuit of the Government's interest rests on recognition that a
prosecutor would owe an ethical duty to those other clients."
70
In the Morales case, even though the tainted prosecutor was
walled off from others in his office, there is still the perception that,
prosecutor's First Amendment rights, even though he was acting in the role of
whistleblower. Id. at 1962.
66. Id. at 1958.
67. Id. at 1960.
68. Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts for the Administration of Justice:
Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in
Government Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 55-56 (footnote omitted).
69. 481 U.S. 787, 806 (1987) (plurality).
70. Id. at 804; see also NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 7.1 (Nat'l
District Atty's Ass'n 2d ed. 1991) (acknowledging that, because of the need of
the public to have confidence in the criminal justice system, there is an extra
responsibility for prosecutors to avoid even the appearance of representing
conflicting interests).
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as a supervisor, he may unconsciously influence the decisions his
office makes. It is a no-win situation. If his office vigorously seeks
the execution of his former client, his client will wonder why he did
not do whatever he could to save his client's life.7' If his office
backs off from seeking the death penalty, members of the public may
wonder whether he has used his official position as a high-ranking
prosecutor to help his former client.
While it is certainly inconvenient to recuse prosecutorial offices
and reassign cases, these measures protect against claims of conflict,
particularly in high-profile cases. Moreover, the fact that a case has
been with a prosecutorial agency a long time is insufficient to
override legitimate conflict concerns.72 The costs of undermining the
legitimacy of the criminal process73 outweigh the individual burden
on the prosecutor or the prosecutorial office.
IV. HIGH PROFILE CASES; HIGH PROFILE ETHICS
To the extent that high-profile cases teach the public about the
operations of the criminal justice system,74 they should reflect the
best that the criminal justice system has to offer. Thus, prosecutors
should not shy away from tough ethical decision in high-profile
cases. Conflict issues do not always have easy answers. However, it
is important for the public to see its government officials taking these
issues seriously.
Even more than other cases, high-profile prosecutions record for
history the priorities and values of the culture in which they are
71. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has reversed cases because the
prosecutor's relationship with the defendant's mother might have led the
prosecutors to go even tougher on the defendant to avoid the appearance of
favoritism. See People v. Vasquez, 137 P.3d 199 (Cal. 2006).
72. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 806 n.17
(1987) (noting that the prosecutor's familiarity with facts of case cannot justify
appointment of interested prosecutor).
73. Although technically, a request for clemency is a request for mercy that
follows the completion of criminal processes, it is part and parcel of the
procedures leading to execution. Accordingly, prosecutors handling clemency
proceedings should still be bound by their ethical duties.
74. For a discussion of the lessons that can be learned from high-profile
cases, see Laurie L. Levenson, Media Madness or Civics 101?, 26 U. WEST.
L.A. L. REv. 57 (1995).
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tried.75 It is time that our high-profile cases reflect that prosecutors
and defense lawyers at all times met their ethical obligations.
Although this essay has focused on the ethical obligations of
prosecutors, defense lawyers also have ethical duties.76 They cannot
75. See Linda Deutsch, Trials of the Century, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 743
(2000); Laurie L. Levenson, Lessons of Trials of the Century, 33 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 585 (2000). To the extent that conflict issues in high-profile cases
indicate a systemic problem with a particular prosecution office, that problem
should be addressed immediately. It is at least curious that both the Santa
Barbara County District Attorney's Office where the Jackson case was tried,
and the San Joaquin County District Attorney's Office where the Morales
matter was handled, were reported to have other cases with serious ethical
problems near the time their high-profile cases were proceedings. For
example, in San Joaquin County, a top prosecutor was fired after an
investigation into his violation of ethical standards. Evidently, the prosecutor
served as the prosecuting attorney in a hit-and-run and insurance-fraud case in
which his former girlfriend was the defendant. When an office has repeat
ethical problems, it is often a sign that hiring and training policies need to be
reexamined. See Levenson, Working Outside the Rules, supra note 5, at 568-
71.
76. In fact, in each of the cases discussed in this essay, ethical challenges
arose for the defense teams as well. In People v. Jackson, questions were
raised as to whether Jackson's original counsel had a conflict of interest in
representing the pop star given the lawyer's concurrent representation of
another death penalty defendant. See Monte Morin & Megan Garvey, Jackson
Replaces His Lead Attorneys, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at B 1. In People v.
Jesse James Hollywood, the defense counsel faced the most difficult type of
conflict. Hollywood called his counsel after he had abducted Markowitz. His
lawyer tried to convince him to let his victim go, but Hollywood refused to do
so and defense counsel did not contact law enforcement authorities, an act that
may have saved the boy's life. See Sally Ann Connell, Lawyer Knew of
Kidnapping, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at B 1. At the time, California law did
not have any exceptions to the attorney's absolute duty of confidentiality to a
client. Since then, and partially in response to the Hollywood case, the
California rules on confidentiality have been revised. See Mike Kataoka, Not
All Secrets Bind Lawyers, PRESS ENTERPRISE, June 27, 2004, at B 1. Finally, in
the Morales case, defense lawyers were embarrassed when affidavits they
submitted from former jurors turned out to be frauds. See Louis Sahagun,
Killer's Legal Team Backs Off in Dispute, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006, at B3,
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/printededition/california/la-me-
morales14feb14,0,7227712.story?coll=la-headlines-pe-califomia. For an ex-
cellent discussion of how courts view conflicts issues and motions to disqualify
criminal defense lawyers, see Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly":
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represent clients with conflicting interests, they cannot represent a
high-profile client whose interests are in conflict with a former
client, and they cannot use the media in a manner that has a
substantial probability of materially prejudicing the proceedings.
Moreover, they can only handle high-profile cases if they have the
time, ability and experience to zealously represent their clients.
Legitimate concerns can be raised about the conduct of defense
lawyers in both high-profile and everyday cases. However,
regardless of the conduct of the defense bar, prosecutors must take
the high road. The goal of the prosecutor is not to win, but to make
sure "justice shall be done.",
77
How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1201 (1989).
77. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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